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Abstract
We model networks of relational (or implicit) contracts, exploring how sanctioning power and
equilibrium conditions change under different network configurations and information transmis-
sion technologies. In our model, relations are the links, and the value of the network lies in its
ability to enforce cooperative agreements that could not be sustained if agents had no access
to other network members’ sanctioning power and information. We identify conditions for net-
work stability and in-network information transmission as well as conditions under which stable
subnetworks inhibit more valuable larger networks.
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1 Introduction
Relational (or implicit) contracts, long-term informal cooperative arrangements sustained by re-
peated interaction are an important governance mechanism for most forms of economic and social
exchange. When several long-term cooperative relationships link different agents in a group, these
agents and their relationships form a network of relations. This paper is an attempt to characterize
some of their features.
Sociologists have forcefully argued that, by ignoring the networks of social relationships in
which economic transactions are "embedded", economists fail to understand important features of
the economic process.1 Like social relations, economic transactions themselves are seldom isolated
exchanges. Most often, they are episodes of a history of exchanges of various type, embedded in
a network of other economic and social relationships.2 This is obviously the case for transactions
within organizations — from employment to interactions between units and employees — but also
for many of those between organizations, in particular supply relations, including financial ones.3
Networks of relational arrangements are not only crucial in developing economies, where explicit
contracting is hard: in advanced economic environments, and most prominently in the fast changing
one of high-tech industries firms often cooperate to share the high risk and return from their
activities. In these industries, formal arrangements merely represent the tip of the iceberg ”beneath
which lies a sea of informal relations” (Powell et al. 1996). On the one hand, lacking contractibility
over the main ingredients — investments into human capital and knowledge transfers — explicit
contracts can only play a limited role.4 On the other hand, the need for flexibility linked to the
fast changing and highly unpredictable environment make rigid explicit contracts dangerous and
vertical integration unattractive. High tech firms therefore often establish informal cooperative
agreements with several other firms, and these arrangements link them in a common network of
relations.5
1The work of Coleman (1988, 1990) and Granovetter (1985) is particularly relevant.For example, the latter writes
"The embeddedness argument stresses instead the role of concrete personal relations and structures (or "networks")
of such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance" (1985, p. 490).
2Greif (1993) and Casella and Rauch (2002) discusses the importance of ethnic ties for trade in environments
where other enforcement mechanisms are ineffective.
3Macaulay (1963) first drew attention on the crucial role plaid by relationships in the economic process; Klein
and Leffler (1981) have stressed the importance of long term firm-customer relationships; cornerstones of the formal
theory of implicit contracts are Bull (1987) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1989); Becker et al (2001), Levin (2003)
and Rajo (2003) constitute important recent developments.
4The experimental work of Fehr et al. (2004) nicely documents the overwhelming importance of long term
relationships for specific economic transactions.
5Saxenian (1994) reports a highly specialized network-like organization within the computer-industry in Silicon
Valley. She argues that networks of informal cooperative information-sharing relations play a crucial role for the
success of the district in comparison with Route 128, a competing district close to Boston. In her words, ”While
they competed fiercely, Silicon Valley’s producers were embedded in, and inseparable from, these social and technical
networks.” It is noteworthy that the informal relations reported by Saxenian are not only of value on their own,
they are of special value due to their being part of a network of such relations between engineers. Examining the
2
The interbank market can also be seen as a network of long term relationships, where the
links that spread contagion among interdependent financial institutions also induce liquid banks to
cooperate and privately bail out illiquid ones (see Leitner, 2004). And social networks have been
recently show to have a pervasive - and often negative influence on corporate governance practices
(e.g. Kramarz and Thesmar, 2004).
In fact, cooperation is often not for the good: corruption, illegal trade (in drugs, arms and
people) and organized crime in general can only rely on relational contracts for the governance of
illegal transactions, which therefore typically take place within networks of tight relations. Simi-
larly, collusive agreements to increase prices or restrain output are a form of illegal (and common)
relational contracts. Multiproduct firms at different levels of the production chain, meeting and
cooperating/colluding in different input, geographical and/or product markets where they have
different costs or capacities, form a network of relations that may link many apparently distant and
unrelated firms, creating pro-collusive indirect multimarket contact where no multimarket contact
is present.
In this paper we describe equilibrium conditions for different architectures of networks of rela-
tions under different informational regimes, paying special attention to differences between circular
and non-circular architectures. Most of the dilemmas mentioned earlier, from hold-up situations in
specific (legal or illegal) exchanges to cheating in cartel agreements or on public good contributions
have the strategic features of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, so our basic model is a repeated game in
which each agent interact in generic, asymmetric strategic situations with the structure of repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemmas and can form links — cooperative relationships — with a small subset of the
other agents. In our model, the links are the relationships, the network is directed and the links’
orientation captures the presence of net gains from cooperation (slack of enforcing power in the
bilateral relation). We consider three informational assumptions: the benchmark case of complete
information, where each agent observes the histories of play of all agents; the opposite case where no
information can be transmitted from an agent to the others on their observed history of play; and
the case where, while agents meet to transact, they can choose to exchange and pass on received
information on the respective histories of play. In this last case we assume that time is required
for information to travel from one agent to the other, and allow for different speeds of informa-
tion circulation within the network. We begin by characterizing sustainable networks where agents
can only have relations with two neighbors. We show that when relations are asymmetric, since an
agent would only cooperate if she receives some incoming arrows, there is a kind of an "end-network
effect" (resembling the "end-game effects" of finitely repeated games), and network structures such
as trees are not sustainable. Circular networks overcome this problem, ensuring that all agents’
defections would be met with punishment, which provide a clear and intuitive explanation to the
biotechnology industry, Powell et al. (1996) point out that the ”development of cooperative routines goes beyond
simply learning how to maintain a large number of ties. Firms must learn how to transfer knowledge across alliances
and locate themselves in those network positions that enable them to keep pace with the most promising scientific
or technological developments.”
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importance attributed by sociologists like Coleman (1988, 1990) to the ”closure“ of social networks.
We then show that the possibility of transmitting information about defections to other agents
in the network is never used in equilibrium if enforcement relies on unrelenting ”grim trigger“ pun-
ishment strategies: when this is the case, once an agent deviates, a contagious process eliminates all
prospect of future cooperation in the network, which removes all incentives to transmit information.
With ”forgiving“ punishment strategies agents may instead choose to transmit information to keep
on cooperating in the rest of the network while punishing multilaterally one deviator. We also find
that under imperfect information and unrelenting punishment strategies, bilaterally enforceable
relations between some agents may hinder the stability of larger networks containing these agents
because these may not be willing to sacrifice their relation to perform their part in the punish-
ment phase that could sustain the larger network. This problem, though, can also be overcome
with the use of relenting punishments. In contrast to results in other literatures (e.g. Kranton,
1996; Spagnolo, 2002), in our model improved outside options, like a more efficient spot market,
may under certain conditions foster cooperation by making the breakup of a relation in the case
of a deviation a credible threat. Generalizing these results to more complex network architectures
where agents may have more than two partners/neighbors, we provide a definition of individual
and communities’ ”social capital“. Doing so, we generalize the definition introduced in Spagnolo
(1999a, 2000), which are based on Bernheim and Whinston’s (1990) multimarket contact paper.
Related Literature. To study networks of relations we borrow from several as yet unrelated
literatures, creating a link between them. Besides being related to the mentioned relational con-
tracts literature, this paper contributes to the literature on the emergence and stability of networks.
Prominent contributions to this literature - elegantly surveyed in Jackson (2003) - include, among
others, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), who model the emergence and stability of a social networks
when agents choose to set up and maintain or destroy costly links using the notion of pairwise
stability; Bala and Goyal (2000a) who consider the setup of directed and non-directed links by one
agent only; Johnson and Gilles (2000), who introduce a spatial cost structure leading to equilib-
ria of locally complete networks; Bala and Goyal (2000b), who explore the role of communication
reliability in networks; and Kranton and Minehart (2000, 2001) who introduce investment and com-
petition after in a buyer-seller network where buyers choose links in a the first stage. Belleflamme
and Bloch (2003) model the formation of networks of market-sharing collusive relations between
firms. These models focus on agents’ decision whether to build and maintain a link or not. The
common central question is: Given a value of a network, a sharing rule and the cost of maintaining
a link, which networks will emerge in equilibrium, and are they efficient? The underlying game
and enforceability problems are left out of consideration.6 Our approach is complementary. We
depart from this literature by explicitly modelling the underlying game, which allows us to study
6In a footnote of their introduction, Belleflamme and Bloch write: ”In this paper, our focus is on the stability
of market sharing agreements, and we assume that these agreements are enforceable. The issue of enforceability of
market sharing agreements is an important one, which cannot be answered in traditional models of repeated oligopoly
interaction. We leave it for further study.” Our work can be seen as a first part of this further study.
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the consequences of its features for the stability of network structures; by focussing on the equi-
librium sustainability of network structures rather than on the process of network formation; and
by showing that the condition for sustainability of each relation of which a network is composed is
generally not independent of the network’s architecture.
Related work that explicitly models enforcement problems in communities has mostly focused
on random matching games. Kandori (1992), Ellison (1994) and others consider repeated random
matching prisoner’s dilemma games, showing how much cooperation can be sustained under no
information transmission between agents. More recently, a similar framework is used by Dixit
(2003a) to study the effects of different types of third-party enforcement, and in Dixit (2003b) to
analyze the efficiency of relational vs. explicit governance systems when distance among agents
differ, inviting in his conclusion to endogenize information transmission. Groh (2002) extends this
approach by including an endogenous decision to pass on information to other agents, hence he is
closest to our framework. In contrast to this literature, we consider situations where agents with po-
tentially changing opponents establish long-term relationship with fixed partners (e.g. neighbors).
This introduces an important forward induction element into strategic behavior when defecting.
We keep Groh’s endogenous choice whether to pass on information on past actions and introduce
the further possibility to pass on informations received by partners in the underlying game.
Our work is probably closest to the simultaneous and independent work of Haag and Lagunoff
(2002) and Vega Redondo (2003).7 Haag and Lagunoff examine a planner’s optimal choice of social
linkages - or "neighborhood structure" - when each agent plays symmetric repeated prisoner’s
dilemma games with those other agents selected to be her neighbors, the agents’ discount factors
differ and are stochastically determined after the planners’ choice, information is assumed tom flaw
along the links, and agents sustain cooperation by a kind of stationary grim trigger strategies.
Among other things, they find a trade off between suboptimal equilibrium punishment (due to
imperfect monitoring) and excessive social conflict (linked to heterogeneous discount factors). Our
approach is similar in so far that we also look at the effect of different network structures on
the maximum level of cooperation sustainable. However, our approaches are very different in
most other respects. In their model, as in Kranton and Minehart (2000, 2001), the presence of
a link is a pre-condition for interaction hence for a cooperative relation. In our model, instead,
the link is the relation and there is no link without cooperation. Moreover, we allow for general
asymmetries in payoffs, so that the same agent can be very interested in cooperating with one agent
but ready to cheat with the other, and consider in detail the effect of different strategies besides
grim trigger. Finally, we endogenize information transmission and characterize the relation with
different punishment strategies.
Vega Redondo models the evolution of a social network where social relations are idiosyncratic
bilateral repeated prisoners’ dilemmas with symmetric payoffs, subject to random shocks.8 In
7We are grateful to Sanjeev Goyal who let us know about these interesting, complementary papers.
8See also Jackson and Watts (2002), who analize the process of network formation when agents interact in coor-
dination games.
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his model, links are created and destroyed by agents depending on the expected net gains from
cooperation; information is assumed to flow across the network one link per period; and enforcement
power is transmitted to non sustainable relations. As in Spagnolo (1999a, 2000), "social capital"
is defined as the slack enforcement power from cooperative relations that can be used to enforce
cooperation in other relations where bilateral cooperation is not sustainable. Vega Redondo is
mainly interested in the formation and evolution of social networks. He assumes circulation of
information in the network and focuses on symmetric situations and grim trigger strategies. In
contrast, we do not deal with network formation and evolution but dig more in depth in terms of
sustainability of given network structures, allowing for asymmetries, different punishment strategies
and agents’ choice of whether to pass or conceal information. Among other things, we show that a
network of relations may sustain relations none of which is sustainable if agents rely only on bilateral
punishment mechanisms; and that information transmission among agents is not consistent with
the use of unforgiving strategies such as "grim trigger" or "Nash-reversion".
Finally, our work is also closely related to the theoretical literature on multimarket contact
and collusive behavior sparkled by the seminal work of Bernheim and Whinston (1990). In their
model, collusion between two firms is fostered by tying collusive behavior in one market to collusive
behavior in the other thereby pooling asymmetries in incentive constraints in the two markets.9
The closest paper within this strand of literature is probably Maggi (1999), who adapts and ex-
tends the multimarket contact framework modelling multilateral self-enforcing international trade
agreements. We generalize and extend the work of Bernheim and Whinston by considering imper-
fect information and endogenous information transmission, and most importantly by showing that
agents/firms can easily exploit indirect multimarket contact to sustain otherwise unfeasible cartels
where absolutely no multimarket contact is present. We generalize and extend Maggi’s work by
considering generic strategic situations and generic number of agents and relations, and by char-
acterizing the role of different information transmission mechanisms and punishment strategies on
networks stability.
We proceed with defining of a network of relations in section 2. In section 3, we derive results
for sustainable networks with the restriction of at most two neighbors. We extend these results to
situations with more neighbors in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Interaction There is a set N = {1, ..., n} of infinitely lived agents i ∈ N able to interact in pairs
according to a connection structure C of two element subsets of N, where ij ∈ C, i, j ∈ N, if they
are connected. Denote Ci the set of connections of agent i. In each period t, connected agents play
9Spagnolo (1999a) extends the setting to objective functions submodular in payoffs from different markets and
shows that multimarket contact may facilitate collusion even in the absence of asymmetries. Matsushima (2001)
introduces imperfect monitoring and shows that when firms meet in a sufficient number of markets efficient collusion
can be sustained under almost the same conditions as with perfect monitoring.
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according to a generic prisoners’ dilemma with idiosyncratic payoffs given by the following matrix:
agent j
Cji Dji
agent i Cij ci,j , cj,i li,j , wj,i
Dij wi,j , lj,i di,j , dj,i
where li,j < di,j < ci,j < wi,j and li,j +wi,j < 2ci,j , ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. The stage game is assumed to
be constant over time. Note that the assumptions on the payoffs imply the static Nash equilibrium
characterized by
¡
Dij ,Dji
¢
. One interpretation of agent i’s actions Cij and Dij is that agent i is
either taking a cooperative action Cij with respect to j, or not taking it, i.e. taking no action at
all, Dij .
We can think at Cij as "contributing" to any kind of local public good, "complying" with the
terms of any relational agreement, or "colluding"; and to Dij as "don’t...". The asymmetric pris-
oner’s dilemma structure captures the essential strategic features of most of the examples discussed
in the introduction10.
Agents are assumed to interact repeatedly. Time is discrete, and all agents are assumed to
share a discount factor δ < 1. For simplicity, we assume additive separability of agents’ payoffs
across interactions and across time11. Agents are assumed to choose actions which maximize their
discounted utility.
Relations and relational networks In this subsection, we define what we mean by a relation
and by a network of relations and give some definitions useful for analyzing these networks. We
start by defining a relation:
Definition 1 (Relation) Given a strategy profile, two agents i and j share a relation if they re-
peatedly play Cij , Cji.
Let R ⊂ C denote the set of connections between agents who share a relation and Ri =
{j| ij ∈ R} the set of agents with whom i shares a relation.
For notational convenience, let gij denote player i0s net expected discounted gains from the
relation with player j, i.e. the difference between the discounted payoff from playing
¡
Cij , Cji
¢
forever and defecting and playing the static Nash equilibrium
¡
Dij ,Dji
¢
forever after
gij ≡ ci,j − δdi,j − (1− δ)wi,j .
In a standard bilateral repeated game setting both conditions, gij ≥ 0 and gji ≥ 0, are necessary
for a cooperative relation to be sustainable in equilibrium, as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma,
10Matsushima (2001) shows this in detail for quantity setting oligopolies, where firms simultaneously choose either
a small amount of supply (”cooperation”) or a large amount of supply (”defection”).
11Removing this (standard) assumption, along the lines of Spagnolo (1999a, 1999b), would complicate the analysis
but leave all qualitative results unaffected.
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Friedman’s (1971) grim trigger (or ”unrelenting Nash reversion”) strategies are optimal in the
sense of Abreu (1988). Note also that if gij > 0 player i does not have an incentive to defect from
a cooperative agreement in an infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma where players use optimal
punishment strategies; but gij < 0 does not mean that there is no gain for agent i from cooperation
with agent j. It just means that agent i would like to deviate and bilateral cooperation is, therefore,
not sustainable. We call a relation of player i with player j deficient for player i if gij < 0 and
non-deficient for player i if gij ≥ 0.
Definition 2 (mutual, unilateral, bilaterally deficient relation) The relation ij is called mutual iff
gij ≥ 0 and gji ≥ 0, it is called unilateral iff either gij < 0 and gji ≥ 0 or gij ≥ 0 and gji < 0, it is
called bilaterally deficient iff gij < 0 and gji < 0.
We are now in the position to define a network of relations.
Definition 3 (Relational network) A relational network N S = (N,R) is a graph consisting of the
set of agents N and the set of relations R.
Definition 4 (Sustainable relational network) A relational network N S = (N,R) is sustainable iff
the strategy profile prescribing the relations in R is a sequential equilibrium.
Definition 5 (Stable sustainable relational network) A sustainable relational network NS = (N,R)
is strategically stable if it fulfills Kohlberg and Mertens’ (1986) stability criteria.
Graphical representation A simple way to represent relational networks is graphical, where a
line or an arrow is drawn from agent j to agent i if ij ∈ R. This is standard in the literature. We
would like to emphasize, however, that our graphical representation of relational networks departs
from the conventional graphical representation in the networks formation literature. There, an
arrow outgoing from a vertex i usually depicts a link sponsored or formed by vertex i. In our
graphical representation, on the other hand, the presence of arrows conveys information on the
sustainability of relations with optimal bilateral punishments, on each agent’s net discounted gains
from defecting from a bilateral relation: We depict a relation ij ∈ R with gij > 0 by an incoming
arrow to player i.
A unilateral relation, thus, is depicted by an arc originating from the agent for whom the relation
in deficient. A mutual relation is depicted by an incoming arc to both players. A bilaterally deficient
relation is just a line. If two agents i, j can take action w.r.t. each other, i.e. ij ∈ C, but do not
share a relation, i.e. ij /∈ R, we depict this by a dotted line. Refer to figure 1: Agents 1 and 2
share a mutual relation, the relation between 2 and 3 is unilateral — it is deficient for player 2 and
non-deficient for player 3 — and agents 1 and 3 share a bilaterally deficient relation. Finally, agents
4 and 1 are connected in the sense that 14 ∈ C, however 14 /∈ R, i.e. 4 ∈ C1 but 4 /∈ R1.
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1 2
34
Figure 1: Graphical representation of a network of relations
Definition 6 (mutual, non-mutual, mixed relational network) A relational network is mutual if it
only consists of mutual relations; it is non-mutual if it does not contain mutual relations; and it is
mixed if it consists of both, mutual and other relations.
As we are going to use — to some (limited) extent — graph theoretical language, let us define the
used concepts here. In the relational network, agents i and j are called adjacent from/to each other
or directly connected if ij ∈ R. The set of agents with whom i shares relations are the neighborhood
of i, denoted by Ri, and j ∈ Ri ⇔ i ∈ Rj . Given N S = (N,R) , the number of agents in N is called
the order of N S and the number of relations in R the size of N S . The number of arcs directed into
agent i is called the indegree of agent i, denoted by id i. The degree of vertex i is the number of
edges of agent i, denoted deg i. An agent of degree 1 is called end vertex. The network in figure 1
is of order 4 and size 5, there is no end vertex, and 2 is a vertex with deg 2 = 3 and id 2 = 2. A
network is called an i− j path if it consists of a finite alternating sequence of agents and links that
begins with agent i and ends with agent j, in which each link in the sequence joins the agent that
precedes it in the sequence to the agent that follows in the sequence, in which no agent is repeated.
An i− j path is called a cycle if i = j. A cycle of size c is called a c−cycle.
Information structures We will consider the following three informational assumptions. Let
Hij be the set of histories in the relation between agents i and j with
³
aijt , a
ji
t
´
t=1,...,T
∈ Hij .
(I1) Complete Information: At time τ , each agent i ∈ NS observes
• (amnt )t=1,...,τ ∈ Hmn ∀m,n ∈ N S.
Each agent observes the history of play of all other agents.
(I2) No Information Transmission: At time τ , each agent i ∈ N S observes
•
³
aijt , a
ji
t
´
t=1,...,τ
∈ Hij ∀j ∈ Ri.
Each agent only observes the history of (his own and) his direct opponents’ play.
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(I3) Network Information Transmission: At time τ , each agent i ∈ N S observes
•
³
aijt , a
ji
t
´
t=1,...,τ
∈ Hij ∀j ∈ Ri and
• (amnt , anmt )t=1,...,int[τ− lv ] ∈ H
mn, m ∈ Rn, where min [l (i,m) , l (i, n)] = l if there exists
an i−m path and if every agent on that path is willing to transmit information on their
own history as well as messages received.
Under the Network Information Transmission mechanism, (I3), besides observing the history of
his direct opponents’ play, in each period each agent i can transmit and receive truthful messages
- pieces of hard information - to/from each agent j ∈ Ri about the histories of play and about
messages they received. A message on past behavior can travel over v links per period. We assume
that agents only meet when they cooperate, hence information can only be transmitted through
existing cooperative relations/links.
1 2 3 4 5 6
T=1,…,5 T=1,…,4 T=1,…,3
Figure 2: Agent 1’s possible ”observations”
For an illustration of the three informational assumptions, consider a non-circular network
with 6 agents, call them agent 1 through 6, as in figure 2. Suppose first agents use the Network
Information Transmission mechanism (I3) , and let v = 2. Then in t = 5, agent 1 observes the
full history of his own play starting at t = 1 through t = 5. Furthermore, he will receive messages
from agent 2 about the play between 2 and 3 and thus ”observe” actions
³
a2,3t , a
3,2
t
´
t=1,...,4
. The
messages from 2 will also contain his received messages and thus agent 1 will ”observe” actions³
a3,4t , a
4,3
t
´
t=1,...,3
,
³
a4,5t , a
5,4
t
´
t=1,...,3
, and so on. Consider now the Complete Information case (I1).
Each agent immediately knows everything that happened between every other two players, that is
for example between agents 5 and 6 or between agents 2 and 3. This is of course also a degenerate
form of Network Information Transmission mechanism (I3) where ν → ∞. With No Information
Transmission (I2) each agent only knows the history of his own play, that is agent 1 only knows
what happened between agents 1 and 2. This is also an extreme case of the network Information
Transmission mechanism (I3) where ν = 0.
Our information transmission mechanisms relate to the literature on perfect, public, and private
monitoring in the following way. Complete Information (I1) implies perfect monitoring. No Infor-
mation Transmission (I2) implies perfect monitoring for agents i and j on their bilateral history of
play, but private monitoring for the same agents on the history of play of other agents and of their
neighbors with other neighbors12. With the Network Information Transmission mechanism (I3), a
12See Mailath and Morris (1999) for an example of private monitoring where the private signal about the other
players’ actions is imperfect.
10
temporal modification of (I2) is assumed. Again, refer to figure 2 and let v = 2 and t = 5. There is
perfect monitoring for all actions that happened more than 3 periods ago. Actions between agents
5 and 6 from period 4 are assumed to be private w.r.t. agent 1. They are perfectly monitored
by agents 6, 5, 4, and 3. The network information transmission regime introduces therefore a
space-time neighborhood structure into relational networks, in the sense that perfect monitoring
may travel through the network with time. Note also that there is no public monitoring in any of
our information structures13.
There are many situations in which there does not exist an institution that gathers and dissem-
inates immediately information on the behavior of network members, as assumed implicitly in the
complete information case (I1). In the network information transmission regime (I3) we thus sup-
pose that information can only be transmitted through personal contact of members of the network,
and that transmission takes time. We assume that in networks of relations communicating besides
interacting is not costly. This, we think, is a reasonable assumption since we have in mind chatting
while carrying out one’s daily business. We will see that an essential feature of this information
structure is that, even though information transmission is costless in itself, agents must be given
incentives to actually transmit information. Even with high speeds of information transmission,
agents may prefer not to transmit information but rather deviate from their relations to reap short
run deviation profits, in which case the potential higher speed of information transmission does not
realize nor does it affect the sustainability of the network.
Specificity We assume fully specific relations, i.e. such that if a relation between two agents
breaks down, these agents cannot substitute it with relations with other agents (i.e., it is not
possible for an agent to substitute a partner with another one)14. Little changes (apart from
notation) if agents are assumed imperfect substitutes, in the sense that a relation with an agent
can be replaced at a finite but high cost with a relation with another agent.
Assumption 1 We restrict our attention to relational networks (equilibria) N S = (N,R), with
R = C.
We allow for costless substitution in a related paper (Lippert and Spagnolo 2004), so that
punishment through exclusion/replacement becomes an option, and find that the results of the
present paper continue to apply: relational networks where defecting agents are excluded and the
relations shared with them replaced by relations between the defecting agent’s former neighbors
are either not sustainable, or not strategically stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1996).
13For an example of public monitoring, see Green and Porter (1984). They assume that players observe their own
actions, but only an imperfect public signal about the actions of the other players.
14The most obvious examples of such situations are networks where a geography limits the set of potential partners
of each agent, or where agents perform different functions (e.g. they supply different goods-services).
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3 Analysis
Most insights can be gained by examining networks with a restricted number of neighbors. For the
time being, therefore, we simplify the analysis by focussing on networks with nodes of a maximal
degree of two, i.e. where each agent can have at most two neighbors15.
Assumption 2 deg i ≤ 2.
In section 4, we will discuss how the results generalize to more complex networks.
3.1 Non-mutual networks
Mutual relations can be sustained by direct bilateral punishments, so if all relations are mutual, a
network cannot improve on what agents can sustain bilaterally. A relational network plays a role
when it allows to sustain unilateral or bilaterally deficient relations, i.e. relations that would not
be sustainable in the absence of a network. In this section, we explore how relational networks
can be sustainable even if they do not contain any relation sustainable in the absence of such a
network (assumption 3). We will show how the network’s ability to pool payoff asymmetry and
redistribute sanctioning power and information improves on what agents could achieve through
bilateral interaction.
Assumption 3 Relational networks do not contain mutual relations.
Let us start with a necessary condition for multilateral punishment mechanisms in a relational
network:
Lemma 1 id i ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ R is a necessary condition for a relational network to be sustainable.
Proof. Suppose i ∈ R and id i = 0. Then gij ≤ 0 ∀j ∈ Ri and i had an incentive to deviate from
all her relations.
This is a straightforward generalization of the sustainability condition for a bilateral relational
contract: For each contracting party, the net gain from cooperating has to be non-negative. The
following proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 1 End-network effect: The only sustainable non-mutual non-circular relational net-
work is the empty one (independent of the discount factor and the information structure).
As long as relations are not mutual, they are not sustainable by a multilateral mechanism within
a non-circular network. Figure 3 illustrates this: Part (a) shows a network that is not sustainable.
In that situation, agent 1 always has an incentive to deviate and the only sustainable network is
empty, as shown in (b).
15This assumption may represent a time constraint: It is always possible not to take an action w.r.t. someone you
are connected to, however, it takes time to indeed take a cooperative action.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Only the empty network (b) is sustainable
Proposition 1 highlights an end-network effect much similar to the end-game effect of standard
finite games and rather general. Relaxing assumption 2 but keeping assumption 1, it is straightfor-
ward to see that this effect generalizes to trees (see figure 4 for an intuition), stars and any other
network forms where there are "end vertices" that have only outgoing arrows.
1
23
4 5
1
23
4 5
Figure 4: Trees
One way to ensure that the necessary condition from lemma 1 is satisfied in a non-mutual
network is to "close" the network. If agents 1 and 6 from figure 3 shared a unilateral relation that
is non-deficient for 1, as in Figure 5, then each agent in the network would have an incoming and
an outgoing arrow, so that a multilateral punishment mechanism may exploit payoff asymmetries.
1 2
3
45
6
Figure 5: Circular unilateral network
To capture this effect, we define below the unrelenting strategy profiles (S1) for the complete
information case (I1), and (S2) for both, the no information transmission, (I2) and the network
information transmission case (I3). These strategy profiles can be thought of as a network versions
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of Friedman’s (1971) "grim trigger" strategies.
Strategy profile (S1)
1. Each agent i ∈ NS starts playing the agreed upon action vector Cij ∀i ∈ N S ,∀j ∈ Ri.
2. Each player i goes on playing Cij ∀j ∈ Ri as long as no deviation by any player in the network
is observed.
3. Every agent i reverts to Dij ∀j ∈ Ri for ever otherwise.
Strategy and belief profile (S2) is a straightforward adaptation of the grim trigger like strategies
(S1) to an environment without full information.
Strategy and belief profile (S2)
1. Each agent i ∈ N S starts playing the agreed upon action vector Cij ∀i ∈ N S ,∀j ∈ Ri .
2. As long as player i observes every neighbor j ∈ Ri play Cji she goes on playing Cij ∀j ∈ Rj .
3. If player i observes a neighbor j play Dji in t = τ she reverts to Dij ∀j ∈ Ri ∀t ≥ τ + 1.
The beliefs players have after observing their neighbors — which we define formally in the
appendix — are such that (i) and (iv) they believe that everybody in the network cooperated if they
observe cooperation on both sides, (ii) and (v) they believe "anything" consistent if they observe
cheating from a neighbor whose net gain from cooperating with them is positive, and (iii) and (vi)
they assign an equal probability to the event that any of the other players was the first to deviate
in case they observe Cooperate from their neighbor with a positive net gain from cooperation with
them and Defect from the neighbor with a negative net gain from cooperating with them. As for
parts (iii) and (vi) of the belief structure, a priori a player does not know anything else about any
other player than that they are all symmetric w.r.t. their incentives to deviate in their respective
bilateral relations. Then the observation that only one neighbor deviated does not provide any
further knowledge. Following Bernoulli’s "Principle of Insufficient Reason", we, therefore, assume
that he assigns an equal probability of any of the other players to have been the first to deviate from
(S2) point 1. This assumption in part (iii) of the belief structure is innocent as this observation is
part of a dominated deviation.
We can then state the following.
Proposition 2 If the relational network is a c-cycle and agents use unforgiving strategies, then:
1. under complete information (I1), a non-mutual relational network is sustainable if and only
if ∀i ∈ NS gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0;
2. under no information transmission (I2), a non-mutual relational network is sustainable if
and only if ∀i ∈ NS δc−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0; and
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3. under the network information transmission regime (I3), a non-mutual relational network
is sustainable if ∀i ∈ N S δc−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0, regardless of the speed of information
transmission.
For the proof of proposition 2, refer to figure 6. Also note that in a non-mutual network sustained
by the above strategies and beliefs, unless there is perfect information the agents’ optimal deviation
is defecting immediately from deficient relations; and it is to postpone defections from non-deficient
relations to the period before the punishment from that neighbor is expected to start.
i
i−1
i+1
i−2
…
Figure 6: Circular unilateral network
Proof. Part 1 of proposition 2: Sufficiency : Consider (S1). Since a deviator faces immediate
Nash-reversion from both his neighbors, it is optimal to deviate on both neighbors, and the circular
network is a Nash-Equilibrium if ∀i gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0. In the punishment phase, the stage Nash
equilibrium is played and therefore a best response. Necessity : Since during the punishment phase
the agents play their minimax strategy, the punishment phase is infinitely long, and it starts
immediately, this is the strongest punishment available to the agents. If cooperation is not possible
with these strategies, it will not be possible with other ones.
Part 2 of proposition 2: Sufficiency: Consider (S2). The optimal deviation for an agent i is now
first deviating on the deficient relation, that is from his relation with i+ 1, and as late as possible
— since deviating from a bilaterally non-deficient relation is a cost — from his other relation. The
second deviation should take place after c− 2 periods. Therefore deviation will not be profitable if
δc−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N S and {i− 1, i+ 1} = Ri.
Since every agent i in the network would want to deviate bilaterally from his relation with i+1, was
it not for the threat of the loss of cooperation in her other relation, after losing this other relation
for ever, "infecting" is optimal. This is true for any belief about the history of the game. Necessity :
Since during the punishment phase the agents play their minimax strategy and the punishment
phase is infinitely long, this is the strongest punishment available to the agents. As there is no
possibility to transmit information on past behavior, it is also not possible to enter a punishment
phase on both sides with a faster speed than one agent per period. If cooperation is not possible
with these strategies, it will not be possible with other — less strong — punishments.
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Part 3 of proposition 2: Assume the network information transmission regime (I3) and unfor-
giving strategies. Suppose agent i observes a deviation of his neighbor i−1 in his (i−1’s) deficient
relation. Then, since, due to the unforgiving strategies, there will never be a return to cooperation
with i− 1, the best response of i in his (i’s) remaining deficient relation would be to deviate from
that relation. Therefore agent i will not make use of her ability to transmit information, leaving
only room for the same strategies as under (I2).Q.E.D.
As we see from part 3 of proposition 2, an important feature of our model is that the design of
the punishment paths interacts with agents’ incentives to transmit information. One implication
of this is that even though grim trigger strategies are optimal punishment strategies in all the
bilateral relations (i.e. if they rely on bilateral punishment mechanisms), for non-mutual relational
networks, the grim trigger-like strategies (S1) and (S2) are only optimal punishment strategies for
the complete information (I1) and the no information transmission case (I2), respectively. They
are optimal because punishment is as strong as possible on both sides, once it arrives there, and it
arrives on both sides with the smallest possible delay. Under the network information transmission
regime (I3) with high speeds of information transmission instead, i.e. in a world where information
can be transmitted via links and this information travels more than one link per period, strategies
(S2) are not optimal anymore. The potentially high speed of information transmission is — indi-
vidually optimally — not being used, and therefore, punishment "on the other side" arrives later
than necessary, reducing the enforcement power of the network. In section 3.2.3, we will introduce
a forgiving punishment mechanism that uses information transmission and that we will show to be
optimal.
A short comment on the circular form of the network is due. Even though proposition 2 is a
statement on a particular network architecture, a c-cycle, of course this circular network could be
embedded into bigger networks. The strategy profiles (S1) or (S2) we studied would not conflict
with that. Our implicit assumption by concentrating on a c-cycle — if it is embedded into a bigger
network — is that the multilateral punishment mechanism (S1) or (S2) is taken for that particular
subnetwork only.
To give an example for circular networks (or subnetworks), one could think of firms located on
a (Salop) circle, with different capacities in the left and right market, cooperating/colluding with
their neighbors. Coleman (1990) insists on the importance of the "closure" (circularity) of social
networks. Giving a graphical representation as in figure 716, he suggests that if parents (A and B),
whose children (a and b) are friends, share a relation, too, as in figure 7 part (a), they have more
”power” over their children — thanks to what Coleman calls ”intergenerational closure” — than if
they do not, as in figure 7 part (b). Lack of relations among parents makes it more difficult for
them to successfully impose/enforce norms on/upon their children. He does not provide a game
theoretical foundation for his claim, but our model fits precisely his story.
16Note that his representation differs from ours by using two arrows to describe one relation.
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A B
ba
(a)
A B
ba
(b)
Figure 7: Representation of two communities: (a) with and (b) without intergenerational closure
(from Coleman, 1990).
3.2 Mixed networks
In this section, we will relax assumption 3 that excluded mutual relation from the relational net-
works under consideration. We will explicitly allow for them (assumption 4), and study their impact
on the sustainability and of the various types of relational networks. We proceed examining the
consequences of an increase of the stage game payoff ci· of an agent i such that one of his relations
becomes a mutual one. Increasing the cooperation payoff ci· of an agent i increases both, the prof-
itability of cooperating for this agent as well as the sustainability of the relative relation with a
bilateral punishment mechanism.
After demonstrating a cooperation-enhancing effect for non-circular networks under information
structure (I1), we will show that a circular network’s ability to pool payoff asymmetry and redis-
tribute sanctioning power under information structures (I2) and (I3) decreases if the unforgiving
punishments from section 3.1 are used. When the increase in ci· transforms a non-mutual relation
into a mutual one, agent i may lose the incentive to exercise the multilateral punishment strategy,
which sustained the network and thus the other bilaterally non-sustainable relations in the network.
Subsequently, we will show that forgiving strategies overcome the problem for information structure
(I3).
Assumption 4 Relational networks contain both, mutual and other relations.
3.2.1 Non-circular networks with unforgiving punishments
Proposition 1 states that there does not exist a non-circular non-mutual network other than the
empty one. This is true because there would be an agent having only deficient relations and, thus,
just an incentive to deviate. If one increases the cooperation payoff c·,· of that agent, so that his
relation becomes mutual, this incentive to deviate of vanishes. Under full information a multilateral
punishment like (S1) can then sustain such a network. Part 1 of proposition 3 states that. Part
2 shows that the negative result of Proposition 1 remains for the other information transmission
mechanisms. And Part 3 shows that the equilibrium in Part 1 does not satisfy reasonable stability
criteria put forward by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). In particular, the equilibrium (S1) does
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(b)
Figure 8: Sustainable networks under (a) info structure (I1), (b) info structure (I2) and (I3)
not satisfy their Iterated Dominance and Admissibility criteria and gives thus rise to a forward
induction problem.
Proposition 3 Suppose deg i ≤ 2. Then
1. under information structure (I1), a non-circular relational network N S is sustainable if
(a) id i |deg i=1 = 1 and
(b) for all other agents in the relational network gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0, and
2. under information structures (I2) and (I3), there exists no sustainable non-circular mixed
relational network.
3. If the relational network under (I1) relies on unforgiving punishments, it is not strategically
stable.
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 of proposition 3 are straightforward. Part 3 of proposition 3: Unforgiving
punishment in our framework means to play according to (S1), i.e. to play D on both sides forever
if a deviation occurred in the network. Ruling out the play of strictly dominated strategies gives rise
to a profitable deviation for each agent i of the mutual subnetwork who is also part of a non-mutual
subnetwork. Let agent 2 in figure 8 (a) play D2,3 and C2,1 in a period t. Then reverting to D2,3
and D2,1 for ever in t + 1 is part of a strictly dominated strategy for 2. It is strictly dominated
by D2,3 and D2,1 in a period t and reverting to D2,3 and D2,1 for ever in t + 1. Thus, if agent
1 observes D2,3 and C2,1 in t, he can conclude that a rational agent 2 does not want to stick to
the multilateral punishment mechanism. Given that 2 played C2,1, there exists a focal equilibrium.
This focal equilibrium is to switch to a bilateral punishment mechanism, the normal grim trigger
strategy. The resulting — stable — equilibrium is the same as the one under (I2) and (I3), sketched
in figure 8 (b). This gives rise to a profitable deviation for agent 2. Q.E.D.
Figure 8 illustrates proposition 3. Under the full information assumption (I1), every agent
knows the history of every other player and can, thus, enter into a punishment phase. Given this,
figure 8 (a) is an equilibrium. Under the other information transmission mechanisms, this is not
the case, figure 8 (a) is not an equilibrium network, while figure 8 (b) is.
The sustainability of 1’s relation in the absence of a network enables cooperation in the network.
However, according proposition 3 the resulting network under (I1) is not strategically stable. The
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Figure 9: Non-circular network with a (possibly) sustainable subnetwork at one end.
mutual interest in cooperation, which made cooperation of all agents in the non-circular network
an equilibrium, puts it on weak feet as it makes it unlikely to be selected as the equilibrium played.
Relaxing assumption 2 (deg i ≤ 2), it is straightforward to see that Proposition 3 generalizes
to lines that are adjacent to subnetworks which are sustainable in autarky. Assume in figure 9
that the subnetwork ({1, 2, 3} , {12, 23, 31}) is sustainable in autarky, i.e. without making use of
possible relations 34, 45, 56. Then, under (I1), strategies (S1) make (a) a sustainable network if,
in addition, g31 + g32 + g34 ≥ 0, g43 + g45 ≥ 0, and g54 + g56 ≥ 0, whereas network (b) is the only
sustainable one under (I2) and (I3), irrespective of the payoffs in the relations 34, 45, and 56.
Remark. All statements made on mutual relations also apply to subnetworks that are sustain-
able in the absence of the rest of the network.
3.2.2 Mixed circular networks with unforgiving punishments
We now turn to circular networks. We will proceed in the same way we did in subsection 3.2.1:
Again, we will increase the cooperation payoff ci,· of an agent i’s deficient unilateral relation such
that it becomes mutual. As in subsection 3.2.1, we will discuss the impact of this change on the
sustainability of a network.
Under full information, (I1), we will retain the results found so far. The equilibrium given by
strategies (S2) however, relied on each agent cheated upon by a neighbor having an incentive to
carry out the punishment on the deficient side. If we introduce a mutual subnetwork, there exist
agents who do not have a deficient relation. Contrary to the full information environment (I1),
and given that with (S2) it is not optimal for agents to transmit information, under the other two
information regimes it is not possible to identify the initial deviator. Agents, who are part of a
mutual subnetwork, may therefore be reluctant to enter into an punishment phase immediately if
they observe a deviation on only one side: They only expect their neighbor to enter the punishment
phase with a certain probability. This leads to proposition 4.
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Proposition 4 In a non-mutual circular relational network of size c with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0
∀i ∈ N S, let δ ≡ ©δ| gi,i+1 + δc−2gi,i−1 = 0ª. For agent k increase ck,k+1 such that gk,k+1 > 0, so
that the network becomes mixed.
1. Then, under information structure (I1),
(a) the resulting relational network is still sustainable
(b) but not strategically stable.
2. Denote with δ the minimum discount factor necessary to sustain the resulting network under
(I2) and (I3) with strategy and belief profiles (S2). Then
(a) for sufficiently low li,i+1 or sufficiently high wi,i+1, δ = δ.
(b) for too high li,i+1 and too low wi,i+1, (S2) does not result in a sustainable network.
(c) a too low wi,i+1 results in strategic instability of the network.
Proof. Part 1 (a): The optimality of the actions during a punishment phase proposed in part 1 of
the proof of proposition 2 only depend on the strategies played by the deviator and his neighbors
being a stage-game Nash equilibrium for the bilateral interaction. Since we have full information,
everybody knows everybody else’s history and expecting the other to stick to the prescribed strategy
(S1), would lead to playing Dij whenever a deviation is observed.
Part 1 (b): The proof parallels the one for proposition 3 part 3.
Part 2 (a) through (c) we relegate to the appendix. Q.E.D.
The intuition for parts 2 (a) and (b) is the following (refer to figure 10): With the beliefs
specified in (S2), if agent i in figure 10 observes Di−1,i and Ci+1,i in t = τ , he assigns probability
1
c−1 to the event that any of the other agents in the network deviated first. Then, the bigger the
network becomes, the more likely it is a priory that the agent that started the contagious process is
an agent other than i+1 and i+2. Since in this case, i+1 will not play Di+1,i until t = τ +2, and
since the net gain from cooperating with i+1 is positive for i, for a big size of the network, it is not
a best response to play Di,i+1 in t = τ + 1. However, for agent i, with probability 1c−1 agent i+ 1
started. Because of that, if the loss from playing Ci,i+1 if i+ 1 plays Di,i+1, li,i+1 is high enough,
the expected payoff from carrying out the punishment may be higher than the one from going on
cooperating for one more period. Furthermore, for agent i, with probability 1c−1 agent i+1 started.
In that case, agent i expects Di+1,i from t = τ + 2 on. Then, if the payoff from playing Di,i+1 in
t = τ + 1, i.e. wi,i+1, is very high in comparison to the payoff from playing Ci,i+1, agent i might
also prefer to punish immediately.
The intuition for part 2 (c) is the following: Strategic stability rules out the belief that agent
i + 1 started and then sticks to the multilateral punishment since this is strictly dominated by
having played Di+1,i in t = τ . This only leaves a high wi,i+1 as a reason to carry out punishments
immediately.
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Figure 10: Circular network with a mutual relation
Proposition 4 shows a trade-off between profitability and sustainability of cooperation in net-
works: An agent, who benefits (too) strongly from relations with everybody he is connected to,
may hurt cooperation between other agents because he may be unwilling to punish deviants.
3.2.3 Mixed circular networks with forgiving punishments
In this subsection, we will show that harsh, but forgiving punishments lead agents to use the so far
unused possibility to transmit information through links (under network information transmission,
(I3)). For high speed of information transmission, these strategies will give rise to equilibrium
networks not sustainable with the unrelenting grim trigger-type strategies studied so far. We
find that these forgiving punishments are optimal strategies under (I3) , while grim trigger-type
strategies are not even though they are in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
Remember that under strategy profile (S2) agents do not exploit the possibility to transmit
information offered by (I3), independent of the speed ν. Because of this, the results under (I2) and
(I3) do not differ. Transmitting information cannot be an equilibrium choice with (S2) because the
punishment phase lasts forever. A defection leads then to a complete breakdown of the relational
network during the punishment phase17, and agents prefer to "grab what they can" before the
collapse of the network by defecting/infecting rather than maintaining the relation and transmitting
information. The potential of high speed information transmission is therefore left unused.
Rewarding agents for transmitting information instead of infecting her neighbor, it becomes
possible to avoid the breakdown of cooperation and to make use of high speeds of information
transmission, thereby, relaxing the agents’ incentive constraint and allowing a sustainable network
for a lower δ than (S2). Proposition 5 shows this.
For that end, let us define the following strategy profile:
Strategy profile S3
1. Agents start by playing Cij ∀i ∈ N S ,∀j ∈ Ri.
17That holds also if one considers a change in (S2) such that the reversion to the stage Nash equilibrium does not
last forever but only for T periods.
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2. As long as any agent i observes Cji ∀j ∈ Ri, and as long as no message containing Dmn for
any m ∈ N S, agent i goes on playing Cij ∀j ∈ Ri.
3. If agent i observes Dji for any j ∈ Ri and she received no message about an earlier defection
of j, agent i then sends a message about the deviation to her other neighbor and plays Dij
until j and i played Dij , Cji for Tj periods. After that i sends her other neighbor a message
about the end of the punishment phase for player j and they go back to 2. thereafter. Each
agent truthfully passes on the messages.
4. If a neighbor k of j receives a message about j’s initial deviation, she plays Dkj until both,
she receives the message that Dij , Cji has been played for Tj periods and Dkj , Cjk has been
played for Tj periods. She returns to 2. thereafter.
5. If agent j played Dji, she plays Cji for the next Tj periods, Djk in the period when k receives
the information on her initial deviation and Cjk for the next Tj periods. She returns to 2.
thereafter.
6. If some agent deviates from the actions in 3. — 6., the punishment starts against this agent.
Proposition 5 In a non-mutual circular network of size c with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N S,
let δ ≡
©
δ| gi,i+1 + δc−2gi,i−1 = 0ª. Let e∆ be the set of δ for which — together with an appropriate
Tj, ∀j ∈ N S — (S3) constitutes a sustainable non-mutual network with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0
under (I3) and eδ = minne∆o. Then
(i) eδ ≤ δ with a strict inequality for high speeds of information transmission (for v > 1).
(ii) if one substitutes non-mutual subnetworks with mutual ones the network is still sustainable
and strategically stable ∀δ ∈ e∆ for any l.
For the proof, which we relegate to appendix , there are four incentive constraints to consider:
1. Every agent has to have an incentive to stick to Cij ∀j ∈ Ri as long as neither he observes
Dji for a j ∈ Ri nor he receives a message containing Dmn for an m ∈ N S .
¡
ICCI
¢
2. Given one neighbor m of i played Dm,i, each agent j has to have an incentive to send a
message containing Dm,i her other neighbor n and stick to Ci,n.
¡
ICCII
¢
3. Every neighbor of an original cheater has to have an incentive to carry out the punishment.¡
ICP
¢
4. Every original cheater has to agree to be punished.
¡
ICLP
¢
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We first show that
¡
ICCII
¢
and
¡
ICP
¢
are never binding. Using
¡
ICLP
¢
and
¡
ICCI
¢
, we then
show that, for a speed of v = 1, it is possible to choose a length Tj , ∀j ∈ N S , of the punishment
period for each agent such that the punishment payoff for her is equivalent to minimaxing her
on both sides forever18, i.e. the strength of the punishment is equivalent to the one for (S2).
Increasing the speed of information transmission reduces the delay of the punishment and, thus,
relaxes
¡
ICLP
¢
which in turn gives room to make it more severe. This establishes (i). Since agents
are being rewarded for punishing their neighbor, they always have an incentive to do so during a
punishment phase even if they want to cooperate bilaterally, which establishes (ii).
Corollary 1 Under network information transmission (I3) and assumptions 1, 2, and 4, for high
enough ν it is possible to find a Tj ∀j ∈ N S such that (S3) is an optimal punishment mechanism
whereas (S2) is not.
Proof. Two elements determine the strength of the multilateral punishment mechanism in the
network: the payoff after punishment starts on each side, and the promptness with which this
punishment starts on each side after a deviation. It is always possible to adjust the length of
the punishment phase Tj for each player j such that he receives an punishment payoff equivalent
to minimax forever. Furthermore, according to assumption 1 R = C, the other neighbor of an
agent that first defects can ”get to know” about the defection and start the punishment phase at
the earliest with the information that travelled through the network. This means that (S3) is an
optimal punishment mechanism. As for high ν, information transmission is faster than contagion,
(S2) is not an optimal punishment mechanism for high ν.
Punishment with (S3) is as strong as possible and as fast as possible, therefore these are the
optimal (punishment) strategies in our network. Proposition 5 also shows that it is not necessary to
have a complete breakdown of cooperation in the network in case of a deviation if information about
past actions can be transmitted. The equilibrium is, thus, more robust (against e.g. mistakes) and
increases welfare during punishment phases.
Since under perfect information (I1) the agent that defects first is known, the complete break-
down of the network in a punishment phase can be avoided through punishments as in (S3). These
strategies19 result in a critical discount factor as for (S1), as punishment was immediate on both
sides already with (S1).
While strategy profile (S3) avoids the breakdown of the network due to mutual subnetworks
for (I3), it can not be used under (I2) since it makes use of information transmission. Without
18To avoid divisibility problems, one can always assume a public randomization device giving the end of the
punishment period for each agent such that in expectation the punishment payoff of the initial deviator is equivalent
to minimaxing him forever.
19All neighbors j ∈ Ni of an initial cheater i start playing Dj,i until i has played Ci,j∀j ∈ Ni for T periods and
then they go back to plaing Ci,j , Cj,i. In all other games in the network, the players go on playing the cooperative
action during the punishment phase for player i. As the initial cheater can always get his minimax payoff forever,
which is the payoff from the punishment in (S1), the biggest T , for which this strategy profile is an equilibrium, gives
him exactly this payoff.
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Figure 11: Mixed relational network containing only mutual relations except one bilaterally deficient
one
information transmission it is impossible to know who deviated first from the equilibrium path and
a targeted punishment of only the agent that defects first becomes unattainable.
Up to now, we have not explicitly considered bilaterally deficient relations. It should however be
clear at this point that a mixed circular relational network containing bilaterally deficient relations
— as for example the network in figure 11 — is sustainable with the same strategies discussed above
under the same conditions given.
4 Higher degree networks and social capital
In this section we show that there are generalizations of the results we obtained for the simple
relational networks above allowing for more than two neighbors20. For this end, we will use a c-cycle
as a basic structure and add a link. We will show how networks of relations that generate "slack
enforcement power" for some agents may enable these to sustain cooperation on additional deficient
relations and even in one shot prisoner’s dilemma interactions. We then offer an interpretation of
this use of networks of relations as cooperation-enforcement/governance devices for new social
dilemmas in terms of the highly debated but somewhat vague concept of “social capital”.
In our model, establishing a link always increases the discounted payoff of the agents creating
it, as it is always profitable to cooperate. However, regarding the sustainability of the network,
though, adding a non-mutual relation has two effects: On the one hand, adding any relation that
is not sustainable in autarky uses scarce enforcement power. Thus, there is a limit to adding
them. On the other hand, if information travels with delay along the links of the network, or where
information cannot “travel” and strategies rely on contagion, new links shorten paths making
multilateral punishments faster.
In the remainder of the section, we consider for each of the three informational regimes, (I1)−
(I3), the effects of adding to a non-mutual circular network a bilaterally deficient, a unilateral, and
a mutual relation, one at a time.
20We have done so already in the sections before when we looked at trees, stars, or non-circular networks, one end
node of which was an autarkically sustainable subnetwork.
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Full information (I1) It is straightforward to generalize proposition 2 part 1 and we state
without proof:
Proposition 6 Assume (I1) and the strategy profile (S1). Then a network is sustainable iffX
j∈Ri
gij > 0 ∀i ∈ N S . (1)
As long as (1) is satisfied, also bilaterally deficient relations can be sustained in equilibrium.
Consider for example figure 12 (c). Agents i’s and k’s being part of the network helps them sustain
a bilaterally deficient relation if the sum of the net gains from cooperating for i and k are big
enough.
i+1
i
i−1
…
k
… i+1
i
i−1
…
k
… i+1
i
i−1
…
k
…
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 12: Adding a relation to a circular, non-mutual network
While “grim trigger” strategies (S1) are an equilibrium, the forward induction argument of
Proposition 3 part 3 also applies here as long as (a) there are subnetworks that are sustainable
without the rest of the network, and (b) there is a “rest” of the network that is not, i.e. as long as
the relation ik that is added to N S \ ik is not sustainable outside N S .
To see this, consider first figure 12, networks (b) or (c). Since ik is a deficient relation for i,
N S is only sustainable with (S1) if N S \ ik is sustainable in autarky. If this is the case, then the
same stability argument made for mutual subnetworks apply. If e.g., agent i deviates only from her
relation with agent k, but not from his other two relations, induces speculation on future play as
under the current strategy profile the deviation is strictly dominated by a simultaneous deviation
on all relations. Furthermore there is an equilibrium — NS \ ik — which (i) Pareto-dominates the
continuation equilibrium in the punishment phase of (S1) and which is (ii) a focal point after this
deviation. This is a profitable deviation, given the agents coordinate on N S \ ik, since gik < 0.
Consider now network (a) with strategy profile (S1). If we add a mutual relation ik to a circular
network N S \ ik that is not sustainable because gi,i−1+gi,i+1 < 0 and/or gk,k−1+gk,k+1 < 0, and if
gik and gki are big enough st. N S is sustainable with (S1), the stability argument from proposition
3 part 3 applies: agents i and k had a ”profitable deviation“ from N S leaving them with ik (refer
to figure (a) for this).
If instead we add the mutual relation ik to a sustainable network N S \ ik, both subnetworks
are sustainable in autarky and there is no need to combine them into one multilateral punishment
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mechanism. Furthermore, under (I1), every member of N S \ ik immediately observes the play of
every other player so that there is no delay in punishment that can be reduced by shortening paths
through the new relation ik. However, even if players agreed on (S1) including ik, the sustainability
of both subnetworks rules out the stability argument from Proposition 3 part 3.
As in previous sections, with more sophisticated forgiving punishment strategies (S3), this for-
ward induction argument vanishes since punishments phases are followed by a return to cooperation
that, together with rewards for the punishers provide incentives to pass on information and punish.
No information transmission (I2) Under the no information transmission assumption (I2) we
now study sustainable networks when agents use the contagion strategies (S2).
Refer to figure 12, first considering network (a). Obviously, if both subnetworks ik and N S \ ik
were sustainable in autarky, treating the subnetworks separately and adding ik to N S \ ik results
in a sustainable network.
If, on the other hand, N S \ ik is not sustainable on its own, adding ik might help sustain the
network for two reasons. First, if N S \ ik is not sustainable because gi,i+1 + δc−2gi,.i−1 < 0 and
if gi,i+1 + δm−2gi,k + δc−2gi,.i−1 > 0, where m is the size of the subnetwork {i, i+ 1, ..., k}, adding
ik will result in a sustainable network if both, i and k have, given their beliefs, an incentive to
contribute to a multilateral punishment using their mutual relation. Second, if N S \ ik is not
sustainable because gj,j+1 + δc−2gj,j−1 < 0, adding ik may result in a sustainable network under
the same condition because the delay with which the punishment reaches j is shorter.
Proposition 7 Let a network N S consist of a non-mutual circular network of size c, N S \ ik, with
gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N S \ ik and a mutual relation ik between two non-adjacent agents.
Let δ ≡
©
δ| gi,i+1 + δc−2gi,i−1 = 0ª ∀i ∈ N S \ ik. Let b∆ be the set of δ for which N S is sustainable
with (S2) and beliefs specified in appendix E and let bδ = minnb∆o. Then for li,k and lk,i small
enough or wi,k and wk,i big enough, bδ < δ.
Proof. Assume (S2) and the beliefs specified in appendix E. As in the proof of proposition 4, by
assuming li,k and lk,i low enough or wi,k and wk,i big enough, i’s (k’s) expected profit from playing
Cik (Cki) after having observed agent i − 1 (k − 1) deviate is smaller than if they not only play
Di,i+1 (Dk,k+1), i.e. infect agent i + 1 (agent k + 1), but also Di,k (Dk,i), i.e. infect also agent
k (agent i). Therefore punishment sets in earlier and a lower discount factor is needed to sustain
N S . Q.E.D.
Again, if i’s (k’s) loss from playing Cik (Cki) if k (i) plays Dki (Dik) or the gain from playing
Dik (Dki) if k (i) plays Cki (Cik) is big, the expected payoff from not punishing is relatively low
and the agents sharing the mutual relation are willing to contribute to a collective punishment
mechanism.
Consider now networks (b) and (c). Here, adding the relation ik, which is unilateral (bilaterally
deficient), involves a trade-off. On the one hand, punishment will be faster, which relaxes the
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incentive constraint for each agent in N S \ ik and makes the network sustainable for lower discount
factors. On the other hand, one agent (two agents) will have to sustain one deficient relation more,
which tightens the incentive constraint for this agent (these agents). The set of discount factors
for which the network is sustainable may therefore expand or shrinks with the addition the new
relation, depending on parameter values.
The conditions for sustainability of the network, which we give together with the belief structure
in appendix E, are a straightforward generalization of the conditions we had for the simple network
with deg (i) ≤ 2.
Network information transmission (I3) Consider first network (a) from figure 12. Given the
feasibility of information transmission, consider strategies (S3) which make use of it. For network
(a) to be sustainable, the incentive constraints for agents other than i and k, are equivalent to
the ones given in appendix D with one change: Since the ways are shorter, the delay with which
punishment sets in is shorter as well, making it easier to sustain the network. As an example for
the incentive constraints for agents i and k, we give the ones for i in appendix F. Again, the
sustainability conditions from appendix D generalize.
Consider networks (b) and (c). Again, adding the relation ik, which is unilateral (bilaterally
deficient), involves a trade-off. On the one hand, punishment will be faster, which relaxes the
incentive constraint for each agent in the network and makes the network sustainable for lower
discount factors. On the other hand, one agent (two agents) will have to sustain one deficient
relation more, which tightens the incentive constraint for this agent (these agents). It is, thus, not
clear whether the set of discount factors for which the network is sustainable increases or shrinks
with adding the additional relation.
Social Capital Consider again figure 12 (c). We stated above that agents i’s and k’s being part
of the network may help them sustain a bilaterally deficient relation between them. This is the
case if the sum of the net gains from cooperating for i and k from their other relations are large
enough, i.e. if they dispose of sufficient slack enforcement power to enforce the additional relation.
Suppose the circular network {i, i+ 1, ..., k − 1, k, k + 1, ..., i− 1, i} is a social network, i.e. the
relations in it are social relations, and suppose the bilaterally deficient relation between i and k is
a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, say an occasional business transaction where each agent can "hold
up" the other. Then the slack enforcement power from our social network, used to govern a one-shot
business interaction, is much like what Coleman (1990) defines social capital :
Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of
different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect
of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within that
structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the
achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. Like physical
27
capital and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible, but is fungible with
respect to certain activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating
certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others. Unlike other forms of capital,
social capital inheres the structure of relations between persons and among persons. It
is lodged neither in individuals nor in physical implements of production.
”...social capital inheres the structure of relations between persons and among persons” and it
makes ”possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence.“ This
is a micro-perspective on social capital. Our model allows for a formal definition for social capital
à la Coleman:
Definition 7 (Social capital à la Coleman): Take a sustainable social network N S with i, k ∈ N S.
Then we define the individual social capital i and k can draw upon for a one-shot business
interaction ik as
scik =
³
max
n
wik − cik, wki − cki
o¯¯¯
Cik, Cki is equilibrium in a MPM containing N S and ik
´
.
The social capital agent i can draw on from being part of a social network is defined as the
slack enforcement power usable to enforce cooperation-compliance in other interactions in need of
governance through an MPM (multilateral punishment mechanism). With complete information
(I1), this is only a player specific definition as it is equivalent to the sum of his net gains from
cooperation in all his social relations scik = min
nP
j∈Ri g
ij ,
P
j∈Ri g
kj
o
. For the other information
regimes, the extent to which existing relations in a social network can facilitate ”the achievement
of certain ends“ for an agent depends not only on his net gains from cooperation, i.e. how much
he has to loose in his social relations. Since the delay with which an eventual punishment sets in
matters, it also depends on partners’ locations in the network.
Robert Putnam (1995) takes another perspective on social capital. For him, the concept ”refers
to the collective value of all ’social networks’ and the inclinations that arise from these networks
to do things for each other.” This is a macro-perspective on social capital, which, translated into
our model, lead to the following formal definition:
Definition 8 (Social capital à la Putnam): Take a sustainable social network N S with i, k ∈ N S.
Then we define the social capital of a society as the average individual social capital in that
society
1
n card (Ri)
X
i∈NS
X
k∈Ri
scik.
The conclusion to be drawn from our model for the construction of aggregate measures of social
capital is: If there is full information about the actions of economic agents, it suffices to have a
measure of the average sum of the net gains from cooperation per person from social relations in the
economy. However, if this is not the case, as in most real world situations, in addition, a measure
of the density of the network should be used.
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Information transmission as social capital We would like to emphasize that the value of the
social network may also rest in the enforcement of the transmission of information on the history
of interactions with outsiders. If the outsiders interact repeatedly with changing members of the
network, transmission of information on the history of the play in these interactions through the
network may help facilitate cooperation in them. In that sense, our model is a microfoundation
of Kandori’s (1992) attaching a label to a cheater by the members of the social network. The fact
that such a transmission of information in a society is of economic value has been shown in variuos
studies, among others in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999).
5 Conclusion
Each of us is involved in a network of long term relationships of different kinds and with different
parties. Networks of social and economic relations include colluding firms, industrial districts,
interbank markets as well as criminal/terrorist organizations. In this paper we have tried to clarify
how the structure of such networks of relations affects the feasible equilibrium pattern of interaction.
In our model, agents maintain long term self-enforcing relations thanks to the information
circulation and the enforcement/sanctioning power ensured by a network of such relations. We
identify equilibrium conditions for different architectures of such networks, paying special attention
to differences in these conditions for circular and non-circular architectures. The basic framework
is that of repeated games between fixed partners with three basic information structures: complete
information, no information, and information transmission through the network’s links.
We show that if agents cannot discipline themselves within a certain relation, the pooling of
asymmetries in payoffs across the network may allow to sustain the relation under all three informa-
tional assumptions. We find an end-network effect, i.e. that a non-circular network or subnetwork
is not sustainable. We find that the possibility to transmit information about a defection through
the links in the network is not exploited in equilibrium if enforcement relies on unforgiving punish-
ment phases. More complex punishment strategies induce agents to use information transmission,
and to keep on cooperating in the rest of the network while punishing a defection (which increases
efficiency and decreases the discount factor necessary to sustain the network). If information can
be transmitted via the network, grim trigger strategies, therefore, cease to be optimal punish-
ments as they do not use the possibility to transmit information to punish cheaters faster. Having
self-sustaining relations in the network turns out to hurt cooperation with imperfect information,
because agents may then not be willing to perform the prescribed punishment after a defection.
When information can be transmitted, the network may be sustained using strategies that reward
the punisher and encourage information transmission.
We model relations as cooperative agreements in generic infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemmas
forming the links of the network of relations. The model is general enough to capture numerous
economic and social situations. We provide a microfoundation to Granovetter’s (1985) idea of "em-
beddedness" according to which, by ignoring the social background in which economic transactions
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are embedded, economists fail to understand important features of the economic process. Our
end-network effect, i.e. the finding that a non-circular network or subnetwork is not sustainable,
provides a clear explanation of why ”closure“ of social networks is so important for social capital, as
argued by Coleman (1988) and (1990). Finally, we drew some conclusions about sensible measures
of social capital in a network of relations, both on an individual and an aggregate level.
Immediate applications of our model include the organization of inter-firm relations in industrial
districts, the enforcement of collusive behavior in business networks, interbank relations and the
effects of ”social capital” on the governance of economic and social interactions (as discussed by
Coleman (1988, 1990), Putnam (1993) and Greif (1993) and formalized by Spagnolo (1999b)). In
her much acclaimed book, Saxenian (1994) attributes a large part of Silicon Valley’s success to a
special culture of cooperation in that industrial district, which stems from a common background
of the early workforce in that area. We believe our model offered a complementary explanation
how a cooperative social networks may help enforce information exchanges and circulation in a
community.
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A Strategy and belief profile (S2)
1. Each agent i ∈ N S starts playing the agreed upon action vector Cij ∀i ∈ N S ,∀j ∈ Ri .
2. As long as player i observes every neighbor j ∈ Ri play Cji she goes on playing Cij ∀j ∈ Rj .
3. If player i observes a neighbor j play Dji in t = τ she reverts to Dij ∀j ∈ Ri ∀t ≥ τ + 1.
(i) aj,j+1t , a
j+1,j
t = C
j,j+1, Cj+1,j and aj,j−1t , a
j−1,j
t = C
j,j−1, Cj−1,j ∀t = 1, ..., τ , they believe
ak,lt , a
l,k
t = C
k,l, Cl,k, ∀kl ∈ R, ∀t = 1, ..., τ ,
(ii) aj+1,jτ = Dj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Dj−1,j or a
j+1,j
τ = Cj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Dj−1,j with gj,j+1 < 0
they can have any belief consistent with this observation,
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(iii) aj+1,jτ = Dj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Cj−1,j with gj,j+1 < 0, they assign an equal probability
Pr
³
ak,lt = D
k,l ∧ ak,lt = Cm,n∀m 6= k
´
, t ≤ τ ,∀k 6= j.
For agents j with id (j) = 2, beliefs are such that if they observe21
(iv) aj,j+1t , a
j+1,j
t = C
j,j+1, Cj+1,j and aj,j−1t , a
j−1,j
t = C
j,j−1, Cj−1,j ∀t = 1, ..., τ , they believe
ak,lt , a
l,k
t = C
k,l, Cl,k, ∀kl ∈ R, ∀t = 1, ..., τ ,
(v) aj+1,jτ = Dj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Dj−1,j they can have any belief consistent with this observation,
(vi) aj+1,jτ = Dj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Cj−1,j or a
j+1,j
τ = Cj+1,j and a
j−1,j
τ = Dj−1,j , they assign an
equal probability Pr
³
ak,lt = D
k,l ∧ ak,lt = Cm,n∀m 6= k
´
, t ≤ τ ,∀k 6= j.
B Proposition 1
Proof. A network has been defined non-circular if for no agent i1 ∈ N S there exists a path
{i1, i2, ..., ik} with i1 = ik. It has been defined non-mutual if gij > 0⇔ gji ≤ 0. In such a network,
there would have to be either an agent e at the end vertex with od e = 1 or an agent m in the
middle with odm = 2. Since we assumed deg i ≤ 2, there will not be any punishment from other
neighbors and agent e0s or agent m0s dominant strategy is to defect from the relation.Q.E.D.
C Proposition 4
First we proof that with an unforgiving punishment, cooperation may break down if we replace a
unilateral relation with a mutual one. We then show that for U i
¡
Cij ,Dji
¢
in the mutual relation
small enough, the set of equilibria will not shrink.
Proof. Part 2 (a) and (b). Consider strategies (S2) and beliefs as outlined above. Suppose, we
are in the situation of figure 10 with agents i and i+1 forming a mutual subnetwork. Consider the
following defection: Agent i+1 plays Di+1,i+2 and after c−2 periods goes on playing Ci+1,i. After
c− 2 periods, say in period t = τ , agent i observes Di−1,i and Ci+1,i. Playing Di,i+1 in t = τ +1 is
rational for agent i only if she expects i+ 1 to play Di+1,i in t = τ + 1. Whether she expects this
to happen, depends on her beliefs on who started the deviation. Agent i may have three possible
beliefs about who defected initially.
(a) Agent i + 1 started and deviated only from his relation with i + 2. If agent i + 1 after his
initial deviation sticks to the strategies prescribed, he will play Di+1,i in t = τ + 1. Then it
is in i’s best interest to play Di,i+1 as well. In the expected discounted payoff, this receives
a bigger weight, the lower li,i+1.
21We will need this part of the belief structure only when we consider mixed networks. In unilateral networks, by
definition there are no agents with an indegree of two.
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(b) Agent i+ 2 started: Then i+ 2 would infect i+ 1 in t = τ + 1, thus, no matter what agent i
plays in t = τ + 1, agent i+ 1 will play Di+1,i in t = τ + 2. Therefore it is better to have a
deviation profit in t = τ +1 and play Di,i+1. In the expected discounted payoff, this receives
a bigger weight, the higher wi,i+1.
(c) An agent m ∈ N S \ {i, i+ 1, i+ 2} started: The earliest period when i+1 would be infected
by i+2 would be τ +2. Thus i will expect i+1 to play Ci+1,i at least until t = τ +2. Since
we assumed gi,i+1 > 0, for this belief it is not a best response to play Di,i+1 in t = τ + 1.
Since agent i does not have any information, a consistent belief is that cases (a) and (b) have
occurred with probability 1c−1 and case (c) with probability
c−3
c−1 . If c gets large, therefore, the
expected payoff for agent i from deferring the punishment phase by one period may become positive.
This in turn delays the expected punishment date of an initial deviator, which leads to a
breakdown of the network if li,i+1 is not small and wi,i+1 is not big.
Part 2 (c). The proof parallels the one for proposition 3 part 3. Q.E.D.
D Proposition 5
For notational convenience the following definition will be useful.
Definition 9 We define a function
θ (c, v) ≡
½
max
© c−2
v , 1
ª
max
©
int
¡ c−2
v + 1
¢
, 1
ª if int ¡ c−2v ¢ = c−2v
if int
¡ c−2
v
¢ 6= c−2v .
This function maps the order of the cycle c and the speed of information transmission v into
the strictly positive natural numbers and indicates the period in which an information about play
between agents i and i+ 1 in period 0 reaches agent i− 1.
In the proof we first consider the incentive constraints for agents in the network not to deviate
from cooperation in phase I (ICCI), from cooperation with their other neighbor in phase II that is
if one neighbor cheated (ICCII), from punishing the original cheater in phase II (ICP ), and from
letting the others punish when she deviated in the first place (ICLP ). In a second step we show
that eδ ≤ δ. It is shown that ICCII and ICP are never binding, so we can concentrate on ICCI
and ICLP . For a speed of v = 1, by an appropriate choice of the length of the punishment, the
conditions for cooperation can be made equivalent to the ones for (S2). Increasing the speed then
relaxes ICLP which gives room to make punishment more severe, which establishes (i): eδ ≤ δ.
Since agents are being rewarded for punishing their neighbor, they always have an incentive to do
so during a punishment phase even if they want to cooperate bilaterally, which establishes (ii). If
T is chosen such that punishment is as hard as playing minimax strategies with both neighbors
forever, this is the hardest punishment possible. Since here information transmission is used, every
mean to decrease the delay before punishment on both sides sets in is used. This establishes the
corollary.
35
Proof. The following incentive constraints are to be satisfied:
1. (ICCI) For each agent i, playing Di,i+1 in t = 0 and Di,i−1 in t = θ (c, v), which is her best
deviation, yields wi,i+1 in t = 0, li,i+1 for the following Ti periods and ci,i+1 thereafter, as
well as ci,i−1 until t = θ (c, v)− 1, wi,i−1 in t = θ (c, v) , li,i−1 for the following Ti periods and
ci,i−1 thereafter. Playing Ci,i+1 and Ci,i−1 forever yields 11−δ
¡
ci,i+1 + ci,i−1
¢
. Summing up
leads to
¡
ICCI
¢
, which is the condition for (S3) to be a Nash equilibrium.
ICCI ≡
¡
ci,i+1 − wi,i+1
¢
+
TiX
t=1
δt
¡
ci,i+1 − li,i+1
¢
+ δθ(c,ν)
¡
ci,i−1 − wi,i−1
¢
+
θ(c,ν)+TiX
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
¡
ci,i−1 − li,i−1
¢
≥ 0
∀i ∈ NS , i+ 1, i− 1 ∈ Ri.
2. (ICCII) Suppose that in period t = 0, agent i− 1 played Di−1,i.
(a) Suppose θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1 − 1. Then nothing changes in the trade-off in his interactions
with i+ 1 from ICCI . In his interactions with i− 1, i will already have returned to the
cooperative phase, which means he will give up ci,i−1 for Ti periods by infecting i + 1.
Thus, i is in the same situation as if he never had been cheated on by i−1, which means
ICCII = ICCI .
ICCII = ICCI if θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1 − 1,
(b) Suppose now θ (c, v) < Ti−1−1. Again nothing changes in the trade-off in his interactions
with i+1 from ICCI . Thus the first line of ICCII coincides with the first line in ICCI .
If in t = 1, agent i plays Di,i+1 instead of sticking to cooperation and just sending
a message, this results in agent i + 1 sending a message that reaches agent i − 1 in
t = θ (c, v)+1. This yields agent i a utility of li,i−1 until t = θ (c, v)+Ti+2. By sticking
to cooperation, she would have had a utility of wi,i−1 from t = θ (c, v)+ 1 until t = Ti−1
and of ci,i−1 from t = Ti−1 + 1. This difference constitutes the second and third line of
ICCII .
ICCII ≡
¡
ci,i+1 − wi,i+1
¢
+
TiX
t=1
δt
¡
ci,i+1 − li,i+1
¢
+
Ti−1−1X
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
¡
wi,i−1 − li,i−1
¢
+
θ(c,ν)+TiX
t=Ti−1
δt
¡
ci,i−1 − li,i−1
¢
≥ 0
∀i ∈ NS , i+ 1, i− 1 ∈ Ri if θ (c, v) < Ti−1 − 1,
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Since
ICCI − ICCII =
( PTi−1−1
t=θ(c,ν) δ
t ¡ci,i−1 − wi,i−1¢ < 0
0
∀θ (c, v) < Ti−1 − 1
∀θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1 − 1
,
whenever ICCI holds, ICCII is satisfied.
3. (ICP ) Suppose agent i receives the message that agent i + 1 deviated in their relation with
one of their other neighbors. Then agent i has to have an incentive to punish him. Since
wi,j > ci,j together with
¡
ICCI
¢
, this is always the case.
4. (ICLP ) Suppose in period t = 0, agent i played Di,i+1. Then he has to agree to playing¡
Ci,i+1,Di+1,i
¢
for Ti periods instead of his minimax strategy forever. After having played
Di,i+1 in t = 0, for agent i sticking to punishment strategies means incurring li,i+1 for Ti
periods and ci,i+1 thereafter. It furthermore means wi,i−1 in t = θ (c, v) , li,i−1 for the following
Ti periods and ci,i−1 thereafter. Deviating from punishment strategies yields di,i+1 forever,
wi,i−1 in t = θ (c, v) and di,i−1 forever thereafter. The difference between these utilities is
represented by
¡
ICLP
¢
.
ICLP ≡
Ti−1X
t=0
δt
¡
li,i+1 − di,i+1
¢
+
∞X
t=Ti
δt
¡
ci,i+1 − di,i+1
¢
+
θ(c,ν)+TiX
t=θ(c,ν)
δt
¡
li,i−1 − di,i−1
¢
+
∞X
t=θ(c,ν)+Ti+1
δt
¡
ci,i−1 − di,i−1
¢
≥ 0
∀i ∈ N S , i+ 1, i− 1 ∈ Ri.
Constraint
¡
ICCI
¢
consists of addends that are either strictly increasing in δ or strictly positive.
Constraint
¡
ICLP
¢
is strictly increasing in δ for δ ∈ (0, 1). Both conditions do not hold for a δ
close to 0. They do hold strictly for a δ close enough to 1, thus there exists a eδ for which both
constraints hold. Therefore under the conditions stated, strategy (S3) is subgame perfect for δ > eδ.
Since li,j < di,j , it is possible to fix a Ti ∀i such that ICLP = 022. Given that Ti, assume v = 1,
such that θ (c, v) = c − 2. For this, ICCI is satisfied for all δ that satisfy δc−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 ≥ 0.
Now consider v > 1. Again, it is possible to fix a Ti ∀i such that ICLP = 0. That ensures the same
strength of the punishment. But now the punishment in the non-deficient relation sets in earlier
which reduces the value of the deviation and therefore for v > 1, eδ < δ.
Since agents are being rewarded for punishing their neighbor, they always have an incentive to
do so during a punishment phase even if they want to cooperate bilaterally, which establishes (ii).
If Ti is chosen for each agent i such that punishment is as hard as playing minimax strategies with
both neighbors forever, this is the hardest punishment possible. Since here information transmission
22That means that the punishment is as strong as if the deviator was punished with infinite reversion to the static
Nash equilibium.
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is used, every mean to decrease the delay before punishment on both sides sets in is used. This
establishes the corollary. Q.E.D.
E Belief structure and sustainability conditions for section 4, in-
formation regime (I2)
For networks (a), (b), and (c) from figure 12, we assume the following beliefs:
For agents j /∈ {i, k}, beliefs are such that
(i) if they observe cooperation on both sides, they believe that all agents in the network cooperated
so far,
(ii) if they observe a deviation on both sides, they believe that the neighbor with whom they share
their deficient relation was the first to deviate, and
(iii) if they observe a deviation only from the agent with whom they share their non-deficient
relation, they give an equal probability to the event that any of the other players was the first
to deviate.
For agents i and k, beliefs are such that
(iv) if they observe cooperation from all neighbors, they believe that all agents in the network
cooperated so far,
(v) if they observe a deviation by all neighbors, they believe that everybody in the network deviated,
(vi) if i (if k) observes agent i−1 (agent k−1) deviate, but the other neighbors cooperate, agent i
(agent k) gives an equal probability to the event that any agent j ∈ {k, k + 1, ..., i− 1} (any
agent j ∈ {i, i+ 1, ..., k − 1}) was the first to deviate,
(vii) if i (if k) observes agents i − 1 and k (agents k − 1 and i) deviate, but the other neighbor
cooperate, he believes that agent k (agent i) was the first to deviate,
(viii) if i (if k) observes agent k, agent i + 1, or both, agents k and i + 1, (agent i, agent k + 1,
or both, agents i and k + 1) deviate, but the other neighbors cooperate, agent i (agent k)
gives an equal probability to the event that any agent j ∈ {i+ 1, i+ 2, ..., k} (any agent
j ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, ..., i}) was the first to deviate, and
(ix) if i (if k) observes agents i−1 and i+1 (agents k−1 and k+1) deviate, but the other neighbor
cooperate, agent i (agent k) gives an equal probability to the event that any agent j ∈ N S \ i
(any agent j ∈ N S \ k) was the first to deviate.
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Let N S \ ik be of size c and the subnetwork {i, i+ 1, ..., k − 1, k, i} be of size m. Then for the
beliefs given, information structure (I2), and li,k and lk,i low N S is sustainable iff
gi,i+1 + δm−2
³
gi,k + δc−mgi,i−1
´
≥ 0
gk,k+1 + δc−m
³
gk,i + δm−2gk,k−1
´
≥ 0
gj,j+1 + δm−2gj,j−1 ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {i+ 1, ..., k − 1}
gj,j+1 + δc−mgj,j−1 ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {k + 1, ..., i− 1}
F Sustainability conditions for agent i in section 4, information
regime (I3)
Refer to the figure in appendix E. We give the conditions exemplary for agent i.
1.
¡
ICCIi
¢
During a cooperation phase, it must be profitable for i to play Ci,i+1, Ci,k, Ci,i−1
at any time, which yields ci,i+1, ci,k, and ci,i−1 in each period, instead of choosing his best
deviation (”static“ best reply), which would be to play Di,i+1 in t = 0, Di,k in t = θ (m,ν),
and Di,i−1 in t = θ (c, ν) and then to face a Ti− period punishment during which he has to
endure payoffs of only li,i+1, li,k, and li,i−1. Such a deviation is not profitable iff
ICCIi ≡
¡
ci,i+1 − wi,i+1
¢
+
TiX
t=1
δt
¡
ci,i+1 − li,i+1
¢
+ δθ(m,ν)
³
ci,k −wi,k
´
+
θ(m,ν)+TiX
t=θ(m,ν)+1
δt
³
ci,k − li,k
´
+ δθ(c,ν)
¡
ci,i−1 − wi,i−1
¢
+
θ(c,ν)+TiX
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
¡
ci,i−1 − li,i−1
¢
≥ 0.
2.
¡
ICCIIi
¢
Suppose that agent i−1 deviated in t = −1. Agent i has to have an incentive to pass
on this information in t = 0 to both his neighbors, i+1 and k, instead of infecting his neighbors
i+1 in t = 0 and k in t = θ (m, ν) and then facing the punishment prescribed against himself.
Again, we have to distinguish two cases depending on the speed of information transmission.
(a) If Ti−1 − 1 < θ (c, ν), then the information that i did not pass on the info, but cheated
instead against i + 1, reaches i − 1 after i and i − 1 have gone back to cooperation.
Therefore,
ICCII = ICCI ∀θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1 − 1.
(b) If Ti−1 − 1 ≥ θ (c, v), then the information that i did not pass on the info, but cheated
instead against i + 1, reaches i − 1 after i and i − 1 have gone back to cooperation.
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That means that i looses punishment profits wi,i−1 for a number of periods equal to the
difference between T − 1 and θ (c, ν). Therefore,
ICCIIi ≡
¡
ci,i+1 − wi,i+1
¢
+
TiX
t=1
δt
¡
ci,i+1 − li,i+1
¢
+ δθ(m,ν)
³
ci,k −wi,k
´
+
θ(m,ν)+TiX
t=θ(m,ν)+1
δt
³
ci,k − li,k
´
+
Ti−1−1X
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
¡
wi,i−1 − li,i−1
¢
+
θ(c,ν)+TiX
t=Ti−1
δt
¡
ci,i−1 − li,i−1
¢
≥ 0
∀θ (c, v) < Ti−1 − 1.
Again, we see that¡
ICI − ICII
¢
=
( PTi−1−1
t=θ(c,ν) δ
t ¡ci,i−1 − wi,i−1¢ < 0
0
∀θ (c, v) ≥ Ti−1 − 1
∀θ (c, v) < Ti−1 − 1
.
Thus,
¡
ICI
¢
holds implies that
¡
ICII
¢
holds. Agent i also always has an incentive to
punish a deviator immediately, thus, the equivalent to
¡
ICP
¢
always holds. We have to
verify that
¡
ICLP
¢
holds.
3. (ICP ) Suppose agent i receives the message that agent i + 1 (agent k) deviated in their
relation with one of their other neighbors. Then agent i has to have an incentive to punish
them. Since wi,j > ci,j together with
¡
ICCI
¢
, this is always the case.
4.
¡
ICLP
¢
Lastly, agent i has to have an incentive to let his neighbors carry out the punishment
on him if he deviated. He can ensure himself a payoff of di,i+1, di,k, and di,i−1 forever
by playing Di,i+1, Di,k, and Di,i−1 forever. This limits the punishment available to the
community.
ICLPi ≡
Ti−1X
t=0
δt
¡
li,i+1 − di,i+1
¢
+
∞X
t=Ti
δt
¡
ci,i+1 − di,i+1
¢
+
θ(m,ν)+TiX
t=θ(m,ν)+1
δt
³
li,k − di,k
´
+
∞X
t=θ(m,ν)+Ti+1
δt
³
ci,k − di,k
´
+
θ(c,ν)+TiX
t=θ(c,ν)+1
δt
¡
li,i−1 − di,i−1
¢
+
∞X
t=θ(c,ν)+Ti+1
δt
¡
ci,i−1 − di,i−1
¢
≥ 0
By choosing an appropriate Ti, the punishment can again be made as hard as in the contagious
equilibrium (with strategies (S2) and the respective beliefs). With ν > 1, due to a faster
punishment, the discount factor necessary to sustain the network will again be lower than
with (S2).
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